

con⋅cept
[kon-sept]
| 1. | a general notion or idea; conception. |
| 2. | an idea of something formed by mentally combining all its characteristics or particulars; a construct. |
| 3. | a directly conceived or intuited object of thought. |
| 4. | Informal. to develop a concept of; conceive: Experts pooled their talents to concept the new car. |
1550–60; < L conceptum something conceived, orig. neut. of conceptus (ptp. of concipere), equiv. to con- con- + cep- (var. s. of -cipere, comb. form of capere to seize) + -tus ptp. ending

Based on the Random House Dictionary, © Random House, Inc. 2009.
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con·cept (kŏn'sěpt') n.
[Late Latin conceptus, from Latin, past participle of concipere, to conceive; see conceive.] |
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Concept
Con"cept\, n. [L. conceptus (cf. neut. conceptum fetus), p. p. of concipere to conceive: cf. F. concept. See Conceit.] An abstract general conception; a notion; a universal. The words conception, concept, notion, should be limited to the thought of what can not be represented in the imagination; as, the thought suggested by a general term. --Sir W. Hamilton.Cite This Source
concept
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Main Entry: con·cept
Pronunciation: 'kän-"sept
Function: noun
1 : something conceived in the mind
2 : an abstract orgeneric idea generalized from particular instances
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concept con·cept (kŏn'sěpt')
n.
- An abstract idea or notion.
- An explanatory principle in a scientific system. Also called conception.
Copyright © 2002, 2001, 1995 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company.
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concept
in the Analytic school of philosophy, the subject matter of philosophy, which philosophers of the Analytic school hold to be concerned with the salient features of the language in which people speak of concepts at issue. Concepts are thus logical, not mental, entities. A typical instance of the use of concept is in The Concept of Mind (1949) by Gilbert Ryle, an Oxford Analyst, which implies that the purpose of the author is not to investigate matters of fact empirically (i.e., by the methods of psychology) about the mind itself but to investigate its "logical geography." Similarly, investigation of the logical features of discourse about pleasure or duty or remembering is concerned with the concepts of pleasure or duty or memory. To be able to use these linguistic expressions is to apply, or possess, the concepts.
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